--- a/model/prov-n.html Thu Jun 28 23:39:03 2012 +0100
+++ b/model/prov-n.html Thu Jun 28 23:44:48 2012 +0100
@@ -2691,12 +2691,12 @@
<dd>The syntax of PROV-N is expressed over code points in Unicode [<a href="#UNICODE">UNICODE</a>]. The encoding is always UTF-8 [<a href="#rfc3629">RFC3629</a>].</dd>
<dd>Unicode code points may also be expressed using an \uXXXX (U+0 to U+FFFF) or \UXXXXXXXX syntax (for U+10000 onwards) where X is a hexadecimal digit [0-9A-F]</dd>
<dt>Security considerations:</dt>
- <dd>PROV-N is a general-purpose language for describing the provenance of things; applications may evaluate given data to infer more descriptions or to dereference URIs, invoking the security considerations of the scheme for that URI. Note in particular, the privacy issues in [[RFC3023]] section 10 for HTTP URIs. Data obtained from an inaccurate or malicious data source may lead to inaccurate or misleading conclusions, as well as the dereferencing of unintended URIs. Care must be taken to align the trust in consulted resources with the sensitivity of the intended use of the data; inferences of potential medical treatments would likely require different trust than inferences for trip planning.</dd>
+ <dd>PROV-N is a general-purpose language for describing the provenance of things; applications may evaluate given data to infer more descriptions or to dereference URIs, invoking the security considerations of the scheme for that URI. Note in particular, the privacy issues in [[!RFC3023]] section 10 for HTTP URIs. Data obtained from an inaccurate or malicious data source may lead to inaccurate or misleading conclusions, as well as the dereferencing of unintended URIs. Care must be taken to align the trust in consulted resources with the sensitivity of the intended use of the data; inferences of potential medical treatments would likely require different trust than inferences for trip planning.</dd>
<dd>PROV-N is used to express arbitrary application data; security considerations will vary by domain of use. Security tools and protocols applicable to text (e.g. PGP encryption, MD5 sum validation, password-protected compression) may also be used on PROV-N documents. Security/privacy protocols must be imposed which reflect the sensitivity of the embedded information.</dd>
- <dd>PROV-N can express data which is presented to the user, for example, label attributes. Application rendering strings retrieved from untrusted PROV-N documents must ensure that malignant strings may not be used to mislead the reader. The security considerations in the media type registration for XML ([[RFC3023]] section 10) provide additional guidance around the expression of arbitrary data and markup.</dd>
+ <dd>PROV-N can express data which is presented to the user, for example, label attributes. Application rendering strings retrieved from untrusted PROV-N documents must ensure that malignant strings may not be used to mislead the reader. The security considerations in the media type registration for XML ([[!RFC3023]] section 10) provide additional guidance around the expression of arbitrary data and markup.</dd>
<dd>PROV-N uses qualified names mappeable to IRIs as term identifiers. Applications interpreting data expressed in PROV-N should address the security issues of
- <a class="norm" href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3987.txt">Internationalized Resource Identifiers (IRIs)</a> [[RFC3987]] Section 8, as well as
- <a class="norm" href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3986.txt">Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax</a> [[RFC3986]] Section 7.</dd>
+ <a class="norm" href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3987.txt">Internationalized Resource Identifiers (IRIs)</a> [[!RFC3987]] Section 8, as well as
+ <a class="norm" href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3986.txt">Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax</a> [[!RFC3986]] Section 7.</dd>
<dd>Multiple IRIs may have the same appearance. Characters in different scripts may
look similar (a Cyrillic "о" may appear similar to a Latin "o"). A character followed
by combining characters may have the same visual representation as another character