Bug 23733 - Consider prohibiting support of active content by CDMs
authorAdrian Bateman <adrianba@microsoft.com>
Thu, 12 Dec 2013 15:33:57 -0800
changeset 216 ced285c99703
parent 215 d9c9406a821f
child 217 9f57a25b86ec
Bug 23733 - Consider prohibiting support of active content by CDMs
encrypted-media/encrypted-media.html
encrypted-media/encrypted-media.xml
--- a/encrypted-media/encrypted-media.html	Thu Dec 12 15:16:14 2013 -0800
+++ b/encrypted-media/encrypted-media.html	Thu Dec 12 15:33:57 2013 -0800
@@ -1084,7 +1084,7 @@
 <div class="issue-title"><span>Issue 2</span></div>Note: This section is not final and review is welcome.</div>
 
     <p>Key system implementations must consider initialization data, key data and media data as potential attack vectors and must take care to safely parse, decrypt etc. initialization data, key data and media data. User Agents may want to validate data before passing it to the CDM, especially if the CDM does not run in the same (sandboxed) context as the DOM (i.e. rendering). </p>
-    <p>It is STRONGLY RECOMMENDED that key data and media data do not contain active content [<a href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4949.txt" title="Shirey, R., Internet Security Glossary, Version 2, RFC 4949, August 2007, IETF">SECURITY GLOSSARY</a>].  If a Key System implementation supports the interpretation or execution of such active content then it is STRONGLY RECOMMENDED that User Agents make use of sandbox techniques to restrict the scope of access that the CDM has to the user's device. In any case, User Agent and Key System implementers should consider the threats, risks, and safeguards described in [<span title="Jansen, W, et al., Guidelines on Active Content and Mobile Code, Special Publication 800-28, Version 2, 2008, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)">ACTIVE CONTENT</span>].</p>
+    <p>User Agents should treat key data and media data as untrusted content and use appropriate safeguards to mitigate any associated threats.</p>
     <p>User Agents are responsible for providing users with a secure way to browse the web. Since User Agents may integrate with third party CDM implementations, CDM implementers must provide sufficient information and controls to user agent implementers to enable them to properly asses the security implications of integrating with the Key System.</p>
     <p>Note: unsandboxed CDMs (or CDMs that use platform features) and UAs that use them must be especially careful in all areas of security, including parsing of key and media data, etc. due to the potential for compromises to provide access to OS/platform features, interact with or run as root, access drivers, kernel, firmware, hardware, etc., all of which may not be written to be robust against hostile software or web-based attacks. Additionally, CDMs may not be updated with security fixes as frequently, especially when part of the OS, platform or hardware.</p>
     
--- a/encrypted-media/encrypted-media.xml	Thu Dec 12 15:16:14 2013 -0800
+++ b/encrypted-media/encrypted-media.xml	Thu Dec 12 15:33:57 2013 -0800
@@ -1023,7 +1023,7 @@
     <div class="issue"><div class="issue-title"><span>Issue 2</span></div>Note: This section is not final and review is welcome.</div>
 
     <p>Key system implementations must consider initialization data, key data and media data as potential attack vectors and must take care to safely parse, decrypt etc. initialization data, key data and media data. User Agents may want to validate data before passing it to the CDM, especially if the CDM does not run in the same (sandboxed) context as the DOM (i.e. rendering). </p>
-    <p>It is STRONGLY RECOMMENDED that key data and media data do not contain active content [<a href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4949.txt" title="Shirey, R., Internet Security Glossary, Version 2, RFC 4949, August 2007, IETF">SECURITY GLOSSARY</a>].  If a Key System implementation supports the interpretation or execution of such active content then it is STRONGLY RECOMMENDED that User Agents make use of sandbox techniques to restrict the scope of access that the CDM has to the user's device. In any case, User Agent and Key System implementers should consider the threats, risks, and safeguards described in [<span title="Jansen, W, et al., Guidelines on Active Content and Mobile Code, Special Publication 800-28, Version 2, 2008, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)">ACTIVE CONTENT</span>].</p>
+    <p>User Agents should treat key data and media data as untrusted content and use appropriate safeguards to mitigate any associated threats.</p>
     <p>User Agents are responsible for providing users with a secure way to browse the web. Since User Agents may integrate with third party CDM implementations, CDM implementers must provide sufficient information and controls to user agent implementers to enable them to properly asses the security implications of integrating with the Key System.</p>
     <p>Note: unsandboxed CDMs (or CDMs that use platform features) and UAs that use them must be especially careful in all areas of security, including parsing of key and media data, etc. due to the potential for compromises to provide access to OS/platform features, interact with or run as root, access drivers, kernel, firmware, hardware, etc., all of which may not be written to be robust against hostile software or web-based attacks. Additionally, CDMs may not be updated with security fixes as frequently, especially when part of the OS, platform or hardware.</p>